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1 Introduction
There exists a wide literature dealing with dynamic advertising either in monopoly
or in oligopoly models (see, e.g., Jørgensen, 1982; Erickson, 1991; Feichtinger et al.,
1994; Dockner et al., ch. 11). To the best of our knowledge, the endogenous interplay
between advertising and product quality has not received a large amount of atten-
tion so far. The few existing contributions in this field usually consider the optimal
control of advertising eﬀorts and product quality in relation with building up the
stock of goodwill, under incomplete consumer information.1 One interesting excep-
tion dealing with a full information model of dynamic advertising and product quality
is in Ouardighi and Pasin (2002), extending the well known Lanchester model to ac-
count for the interplay between market shares and quality.2 Others have investigated,
adopting either static or dynamic approaches, the strategic use of product qualities
as firms’ instruments to build up market shares (Moorthy, 1988; Motta, 1993; Dutta
et al., 1995).
We study persuasive advertising in a dynamic market where fully informed con-
sumers may choose between two goods characterised by diﬀerent quality levels which
are endogenously determined. We consider (i) the diﬀerential game between two
single-product firms; (ii) the optimal control problem faced by a monopolist supply-
ing both varieties so as to maximise profits, and (iii) the optimal control problem
solved by a benevolent planner supplying both varieties so as to maximise social
welfare.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. In the duopoly game, there
exist parameter ranges wherein the low-quality firm earns higher profits than the
high-quality firm, due to the fact that the number of consumers choosing the low-
quality good is considerably larger than the number of those who buy the high-quality
good. This is in contrast with the acquired wisdom coming from the existing static
games describing quality competition in oligopoly (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979,
1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Lehmann-Grube, 1997, inter alia), where the
possible interaction between quality and advertising is completely disregarded and
the equilibrium market share of the high-quality good is always larger than the low-
quality good’s. While in the static literature on this issue it is always true that
supplying a superior quality enables the firm (i) to extract a higher profit margin
from each unit and (ii) to obtain a larger market share than rivals’, here we show
that being able to attract the richest set of costumers is insuﬃcient to ensure higher
profits because inferior qualities may serve larger market shares. This appears to be
realistic, e.g. if one considers that selling a luxury motorbike like Ducati 999 may well
entail a larger unit price-cost margin than selling a Honda Hornet, but the number
1See Schmalensee (1978), Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979), Conrad (1985), Feichtinger et al.
(1994, and the references therein).
2For the formulation of the Lanchester model, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 11), Case (1979),
Sorger (1989) and Erickson (1991).
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of customers that can aﬀord a Hornet is surely much larger than the number of those
who may aﬀord a Ducati 999.
Moreover, in our model the quality levels turn out to be independent of the mar-
ket regime, i.e., they are the same at the duopoly, monopoly, and planning equilibria.
Again, this finds no correspondence in the static literature on vertical product diﬀer-
entiation, where it usually emerges that the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation at the
duopoly equilibrium is larger than the monopoly optimum and the social optimum,
due to the incentive for firms to increase product diﬀerentiation so as to soften price
competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989). In addition
to this, our result also tells that there is no quality distortion at the monopoly equilib-
rium, as compared to the first best. While in static models we observe the incentive
for the monopolist to under- or oversupply product quality in order to induce self-
discrimination across consumers (Spence, 1975; Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Champsaur
and Rochet, 1989), here we only observe a downward distortion in output levels due
to monopoly power.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic setup is laid out in
section 2. The duopoly setting is investigated in section 3, while section 4 contains
the analysis of the monopoly and first best equilibria. Concluding remarks are in
section 5.
2 The Model
Traditionally, models dealing with vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly postulate the ex-
istence of a consumers’ gross surplus function which is assumed to be non-separable
in its arguments. Instead, we assume that all the arguments of the utility function
are additively separable. Consumers are indexed by a marginal willingness to pay
θ ∈ [0, θ1] with density equal to one, so that the total mass of consumers is θ1. The
distribution of consumers and the support are invariant w.r.t. time. The market ex-
ists for t ∈ [0,∞) , with time being considered as continuous. At each t, the market is
supplied by two single-product firms oﬀering goods of quality qi(t) with i = {H,L},
qH(t) ≥ qL(t) ≥ 0, which are perfectly observable, together with the price vector,
by consumers before purchase. Production entails an instantaneous variable cost of
quality improvement, which is assumed to be convex in the current quality level:
Ci(t) = cixi(t) [qi(t)]
2 (1)
with constant parameters 0 < cH < cL indicating that the high quality firm is more
eﬃcient in the production of quality.
From the consumption of the high quality good, a consumer of type θ draws the
following net surplus:
UH = θ + qH(t)− pH(t) (2)
3
where pH(t) is the market price of variety H at time t. Similarly, from the con-
sumption of the low quality good, a consumer indexed by θ draws the following net
surplus:
UL = sθ + qL(t)− pL(t) (3)
where pL(t) is the market price of variety L at time t, and s ∈ (0, 1) is a positive and
time-invariant parameter capturing the idea that gross satisfaction of such consumer
from buying the low quality is lower. If a consumer does not buy either variety,
the resulting utility is nil. In order to obtain the expressions of market demands,
we compute the threshold of θ which characterizes the consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying from the high quality firm and buying from the low quality firm:
eθ(t) = pH(t)− pL(t)− qH(t) + qL(t)
1− s (4)
and the analogous threshold of θ characterizing the consumer who is indiﬀerent be-
tween buying from the low quality firm and not buying at all:
hθ(t) = pL(t)− qL(t)
s
(5)
The direct demand system follows:
xH(t) = θ1 − eθ(t) (6)
xL(t) = eθ(t)− hθ(t) (7)
provided that hθ(t) > 0, ensuring that we are in the non-degenerate case where partial
market coverage prevails. If so, we can write the inverse demand system:
pH(t) = θ1 + qH(t)− xH(t)− sxL(t) (8)
pL(t) = qL(t) + s [θ1 − xH(t)− xL(t)] (9)
Observe that expressions (4-9) correctly define the demand system if and only if
eθ(t) ≥ hθ(t), which amounts to requiring that s [pH (t)− qH (t)] ≥ [pL (t)− qL (t)] . In
the remainder of the paper, we will check that this condition indeed holds at the
duopoly steady state equilibrium. The economic interpretation of this requirement
is that one should exclude the case of quality leapfrogging in either direction, i.e.,
any situation such that the firm endowed with a technological eﬃciency parameter
cH (respectively, cL) decides to produce a lower (resp., higher) quality than the firm
using the less (resp., more) eﬃcient technology.
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Instantaneous profits write as follows:
πi(t) =

pi(t)− ci [qi(t)]2

xi(t)− bi [ai(t)]2 (10)
where bi [ai(t)]
2 is the instantaneous cost of investing in advertising, ai(t) being the
advertising eﬀort of firm i at time t. We assume that sales evolve over time in
response to advertising investments, according to the following kinematic equation
(as in Vidale and Wolfe, 1957):
∂xi(t)
∂t
≡ ·xi= ai(t)− δxi(t) i = H,L (11)
where δ denotes the depreciation (disaﬀection) rate, constant over time and common
to both firms. It is worth stressing that this advertising technology has asymmetric
eﬀects on the market demand of the two firms. The reason is that the low-quality
firm may increase demand by attracting consumers in the lower part of the preference
spectrum (i.e., pushing hθ(t) down) as well as in the intermediate range of preferences
(i.e., pushing eθ(t) up), while the high-quality firm can only fight against the rival for
eθ(t), since the upper bound of the willingness to pay, θ1, is given. This preludes to
the possibility for the low-quality firm to perform better than the high-quality firm
in equilibrium.
Firm i aims at maximising the discounted profit flow:
Πi(t) =
] ∞
0
πi(t)e
−ρt (12)
w.r.t. controls qi(t) and ai(t), under the constraint given by the state dynamics (11).
For future reference , we also define consumer surplus:
CS(t) = CSL(t) + CSH(t) =
eθ(t)]
hθ(t)
(sz + qL(t)− pL(t)) dz +
θ1]
eθ(t)
(z + qH(t)− pH(t)) dz
(13)
where
CSL(t) =
s [xL(t)]
2
2
; CSH(t) =
xH(t)
2
[xH (t) + 2sxL (t)] . (14)
If we disregard the issue of surplus distribution between consumers and producers,
and confine our attention to Pareto eﬃciency, we can define welfare as follows:
W (t) = CSH(t) + CSL(t) + πH(t) + πL(t). (15)
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3 Duopoly Equilibrium
Firm is current value Hamiltonian function is:
Hi(t) = e−ρt
k
πi(t) + λii(t)
·
xi +λij(t)
·
xj
l
(16)
First order conditions (FOCs) on controls are (henceforth, we omit the indication of
time for brevity):3
∂Hi
∂qi
= 0⇒ xi (1− 2ciqi) = 0⇒ qi =
1
2ci
(17)
∂Hi
∂ai
= 0⇒ −2aibi + λii = 0⇒ λii = 2aibi ⇒
·
λii= 2
·
ai bi (18)
The above FOCs entail that the present game is a ‘linear state game’, producing
subgame perfect (or Markov perfect) open-loop Nash equilibria.4 Notice also that
condition (17-18) do not contain λij because the present game features separated
dynamics.5 Therefore, the problem admits the solution λij = 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞) and
j 9= i. Accordingly we specify only one co-state equation per firm:
∂HH
∂xH
= −δλHH + θ1 + qH − cHq2H − 2xH − sxL = ρλHH−
·
λHH (19)
∂HL
∂xL
= −δλLL + qL − cLq2L + s(θ1 − xH − 2xL) = ρλLL−
·
λLL (20)
along with the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µi(t)xi(t) = 0 (21)
and the initial conditions xi(0) > 0.
Now, using (18) and the co-state equations, we write:
·
aH=
·
λHH
2bH
= − 1
4cH
− θ1 + 2aHbH(δ + ρ) + 2xH + sxL (22)
3Second order conditions are always met throughout the paper. They are omitted for brevity.
4See, e.g., Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978) and Feichtinger (1983). For an exhaustive exposi-
tion of linear state games, see Dockner et al. (2000, chapter 7).
5This also entails that, rewriting the model over a finite time horizon with an appropriate scrap
value, this problem could also be solved with the alternative coordinate transformation methos of
Dockner and Leitmann (2001).
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·
aL=
·
λLL
2bL
= − 1
4cL
+ 2aLbL(δ + ρ) + s(−θ1 + xH + 2xL) (23)
The steady state equilibrium requires
·
aH= 0,
·
aL= 0, yielding:
aH =
1 + 4cH(θ1 − 2xH − sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
(24)
aL =
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − xH − 2xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
(25)
which can be plugged into the system of state equations (11), simplifying as follows:
·
xH=
1 + 4cH(θ1 − 2xH − sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
− δxH (26)
·
xL=
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − xH − 2xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
− δxL (27)
We are interested in investigating the dynamics of the system in the positive quadrant
of the space {xi, ai}, which is described in figure 1. The system
q ·
xi= 0,
·
ai= 0
r
yields
the following steady state sales:
xSSH =
2bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ)− s [−2cL + cH (1 + 4cLθ1(s− 2))]
4cHcL(4bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ) + (4 + 4bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
(28)
xSSL =
−cLs+ 2cH(1 + 2cLθ1s+ bHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s))
4cHcL(4bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ) + (4 + 4bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
(29)
These expressions can be plugged into (24-25) to yield the optimal investments in
advertising, aSSi . The following holds:
Proposition 1 The steady state defined by

aSSi , x
SS
i

is a saddle point.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above output levels are acceptable if and only if they are non-negative. This
of course depends upon the relative size of demand and cost parameters, {s, θ1, bi, ci} .
First note that the denominator of xSSi is positive for all admissible values of parame-
ters. Since we are treating the issue of enlarging market shares through advertising,
it is interesting to examine the non-negativity of outputs in terms of parameters bi
and their interaction with production cost parameters ci. We can prove:
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Lemma 2 The equilibrium output of the high-quality firm, xSSH , is always positive.
Proof. Examine the numerator of (28). The first term
2bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ)
is clearly positive. Then, it can be quickly established that:
−s [−2cL + cH (1 + 4cLθ1(s− 2))] > 0
as well. To see this, rewrite it as:
s [(2cL − cH) + 4cHcLθ1 (2− s)]
which is positive for all s ∈ (0, 1) and cH < cL.
Now examine the output of the low-quality firm:
Lemma 3 If
cH ∈

cLs
2 (1 + 2cLθ1s)
, cL

,
then xSSL > 0 for all bH > 0. If instead
cH ∈

0 ,
cLs
2 (1 + 2cLθ1s)

,
then xSSL > 0 for all
bH > bH ≡
scL − 2cH (1 + 2cLθ1s)
2δcH (ρ+ δ) (1 + 4θ1cLs)
≥ 0 .
Otherwise, xSSL = 0 for all bH ∈

0, bH

.
Proof. In general, xSSL > 0 for all
bH > bH ≡
scL − 2cH (1 + 2cLθ1s)
2δcH (ρ+ δ) (1 + 4θ1cLs)
.
This is surely true for all admissible bH if
cH ∈

cLs
2 (1 + 2cLθ1s)
, cL

,
since this implies bH < 0. In the case where
cH ∈

0 ,
cLs
2 (1 + 2cLθ1s)

,
then bH ≥ 0. Therefore, in this range of cH , we have that xSSL ≥ 0 iﬀ bH ≥ bH . This
concludes the proof.
Now, on the basis of Lemma 3, one can also check that, in equilibrium, the non
negativity of xSSL ≡ eθ(t) − hθ(t) also ensures that eθ(t) ≥ hθ(t). Lemmata 2-3 directly
imply a relevant Corollary:
8
Corollary 4 If
cH ∈

0 ,
cLs
2 (1 + 2cLθ1s)

,
then the high-quality firm is a monopolist for all bH ∈

0, bH

.
When the eﬃciency of the advertising technology of firm H is very high (or,
conversely, the cost of advertising is suﬃciently low), there is no room in the market
for the inferior variety.
For (28-29) to be acceptable, it must also be that θ1 > xSSH +x
SS
L , i.e., firms indeed
cover the market only partially:
Lemma 5 θ1 > xSSH + x
SS
L for all bH > max {bH , 0} , where:
bH ≡
cL [s+ 2bLδ (δ + ρ)] + cH [2− 8bLcLδθ1 (δ + ρ)− s (1 + 4cLθ1)]
2cHδ (δ + ρ) [4cLθ1 (2bLδ (δ + ρ) + s)− 1]
with ∂bH/∂bL < 0 always.
Proof. The derivation of bH is straigthforward. Then observe that:
∂bH
∂bL
= − cL [1 + 4cHθ1 (1− s)]
cH [4cLθ1 (2bLδ (δ + ρ) + s)− 1]2
< 0.
The above result entails that, intuitively, partial market coverage is easier to
obtain in equilibrium, the higher the level of both advertising cost parameters. Now
define as
ebH ≡
2bLcLδ(δ + ρ) + 3cLs− cH(2 + s+ 4cLθ1(−2bLδ(δ + ρ) + (−1 + s)s))
2cHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s)
(30)
the level of bH such that xSSH = x
SS
L . Assessing x
SS
H − xSSL one can easily prove:6
Lemma 6 If ebH > 0, then xSSH > xSSL for all bH ∈

0,ebH

; xSSH < x
SS
L for all
bH > ebH . If instead ebH ≤ 0, then xSSL > xSSH .
The foregoing discussion (in particular, Corollary 4 and Lemma 6) opens the
possibility that there exist admissible parameter constellations such that both firms
enjoy positive market shares and profits in equilibrium, with the low-quality firm
serving more consumers and earning higher profits than the high-quality firm.
6As we already know, for all s ∈ (0, 1) , the denominator of xSSi is always positive. Therefore,
the value of bH such that xSSH − xSSL = 0 is unique and it is given by ebH .
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We now turn to the comparative statics on the steady state level of sales w.r.t.
all parameters. First, the property ∂xSSi /∂cj > 0, i 9= j, can be easily interpreted.
All else equal, as firm j becomes less eﬃcient in supplying quality (i.e., qj decreases
as cj increases), the product of firm j becomes less appealing and some customers
switch to firm i. With regard to an increase in the own cost of quality improvement,
we have the expected property ∂xSSi /∂ci < 0. Not surprisingly, ∂x
SS
i /∂θ1 > 0. That
is, as the market becomes more aﬄuent, demand for all varieties increases.
Now consider the eﬀects of a change in the eﬃciency of the advertising investments
on market shares. First of all, notice that
∂xSSH
∂bH
< 0 ;
∂xSSL
∂bH
> 0 (31)
in the whole admissible parameter range. This is what one would expect from the
outset: as the advertising campaign of firm H becomes less expensive (or more ef-
fective), the demand for the high-quality good is enhanced while that for the inferior
variety shrinks.
The eﬀect of a change in bL on xSSi is more involved:
∂xSSH
∂bL
> 0 and
∂xSSL
∂bL
< 0 for all cH > hcH ; (32)
hcH =
scL
2[1 + 2cLθ1s+ bHδ(1 + 4cLθ1s)(δ + ρ)]
and conversely for all cH ∈ (0,hcH ] . This means that, when vertical product diﬀeren-
tiation is relatively low (which holds when cH > hcH), any increase in bL drive some
consumers to switch from the inferior variety to the high-quality good. This does not
happen if the degree of diﬀerentiation is large enough.
We are now in a position to assess firms’ relative performance in terms of steady
state profits:
πSSH =
(1 + bHδ(δ + 2ρ))[−2bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ)− 2cL + cH(1 + 4cLθ1(−2 + s))s]2
16c2Hc
2
L[4bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)) + (4 + 4bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s]2
(33)
πSSL =
(bLδ(δ + 2ρ) + s)[cLs− 2cH(1 + 2cLθ1s+ bHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s))]2
16c2Hc
2
L[4bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)) + (4 + 4bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s]2
(34)
By evaluating the sign of the diﬀerence between πSSH and π
SS
L , we obtain a critical
value hbH at which πSSH = πSSL entailing the following:7
7The equation πSSH = π
SS
L yields two roots. While the smaller one is always negative, the larger
may or may not be positive. The expressions are omitted for brevity.
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Lemma 7 If hbH > 0, then πSSH > πSSL for all bH ∈

0,hbH

; πSSH < π
SS
L for all
bH > hbH . If instead hbH ≤ 0, then πSSL > πSSH .
Moreover, comparing ebH against bH , we obtain:
Lemma 8 ebH > bH always.
Proof. It suﬃces to observe that
ebH − bH ∝ 2bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ)− s [−2cL + cH (1 + 4cLθ1(s− 2))]
with the expression of the r.h.s. coinciding with the numerator of (28), that, as we
already know from Lemma 2, is always positive.
Lemmata 6-8 yield a partition of the parameter space into three regions, according
to the value assumed by the advertising eﬃciency parameter of high quality firm, bH .
This partition is illustrated in figure 1, assuming the parameter set is such that
hbH > ebH > 0 > max

bH , bH

.8 This means that we exclude the trivial case where
the market is a monopoly for firm H.
Figure 1 : Parameter Space
!
bHebH hbH0
πSSH < π
SS
Lπ
SS
H > π
SS
Lπ
SS
H > π
SS
L
xSSH > x
SS
L x
SS
H < x
SS
L x
SS
H < x
SS
L
aSSH > a
SS
L a
SS
H < a
SS
L a
SS
H < a
SS
L
Proposition 9 Take the values of {s, θ1, ci} such that hbH > ebH > 0. If bH ∈ (0,ebH),
then xSSH > x
SS
L , a
SS
H > a
SS
L and π
SS
H > π
SS
L . If bH ∈ (ebH ,hbH), then xSSH < xSSL , aSSH
< aSSL and π
SS
H > π
SS
L . If bH > hbH , then xSSH < xSSL , aSSH < aSSL and πSSH < πSSL .
The above Proposition illustrates a situation where parameter values are such
that there exists an admissible ranges wherein both firms are active and earn positive
profits in steady state. Moreover, in contrast with the conclusions commonly drawn
from the static approach to vertical diﬀerentiation in oligopoly, in one subset of pa-
rameters the low-quality firm performs better than the high-quality firm in terms of
both market share and equilibrium profits. This fact can be interpreted as follows.
8One such numerical example is in the Appendix.
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First of all, consider that the critical levels hbH and ebH are a function of bL. Then, ex-
amine the case bH ∈ (0,ebH). Here, the advertising technology of firm H is suﬃciently
eﬃcient, as compared to that of firm L, to imply that firm H acquires a dominant
position in the market. If instead bH ∈ (ebH ,hbH), the relative decrease in the eﬃciency
of her advertising campaign induces firm H to invest less in advertising, which, in
turn, entails that her equilibrium demand becomes lower than firm L’s. This, how-
ever, is not yet suﬃcient to reverse the inequality on profits because the reduction
in the market share is still more than oﬀset by the quality diﬀerential. In the third
range, where bH > hbH , the distribution of consumers between firms induces a reversal
of the profit ranking. All this amounts to saying that having a larger market share
in equilibrium is not suﬃcient to earn higher profits than the rival.
Observe that, in line of principle, ebH > hbH is admissible. However, this case
would not allow for a sensible interpretation in terms of the underlying economics. In
particular, if that were indeed the case, one would observe a non-monotone behaviour
of the relative profits of firms. In particular, as the advertising technology of firm H
becomes less eﬃcient, we would obtain that initially πSSH > π
SS
L , then π
SS
H < π
SS
L for
bH ∈ (hbH ,ebH), then again πSSH > πSSL for bH > ebH . For this reason, we can dismiss
such a case.
4 Monopoly and Social Planning
Now we examine the regimes where, respectively, both plants are controlled by (i)
a profit-seeking monopolist, and (ii) a benevolent planner maximising social welfare.
In the monopoly regime (M), the current value Hamiltonian function turns out to
be:
HM = e−ρt(πH + πL + λH ·xH +λL ·xL) (35)
while under social planning (SP ), it writes:
HSP = e−ρt(W + λH ·xH +λL ·xL) (36)
where the instantaneous social welfare function W is defined as in (15).
The first relevant result is stated in the following:
Proposition 10 Under both monopoly and social planning, optimal qualities are the
same as under the profit-seeking duopoly (D):
qki =
1
2ci
, i = H,L, k = D,M,SP.
Proof. To show this, it suﬃces to observe that, irrespective of the property structure
of the two plants (i.e., of the regime k), the first order condition on the Hamiltonian
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w.r.t. quality qi is:
∂Hk
∂qi
=
∂HDi
∂qi
=
∂πi
∂qi
= 0
since consumer surplus (14) is independent of quality levels.
Another obvious result needs no proof. This regards the profit performance of
the industry in the three regimes at stake. Clearly, the highest attainable profits in
equilibrium accrue to the monopolist selling both varieties, that, by definition, must
perform better than the sum of two independent single-good duopolists. Then, it is
also straightforward that the profit-seeking duopolists earn strictly larger profits than
a social planner taking care of consumer surplus into his objective function.
Concerning the performance of the monopolist selling both varieties, we can prove:
Proposition 11 Under monopoly, the optimal advertising eﬀorts for generic output
levels are:
aMH =
1 + 4cH(θ1 − 2xH − 2sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
; aML =
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − 2xH − 2xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
while steady state output levels are:
xMH =
bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ) + s(cL + cH(−1 + 4cLθ1 − 4cLsθ1))
8cHcL(bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
xML =
−cLs+ cH(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s))
8cHcL(bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
.
The monopoly equilibrium is a saddle point.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If a planner controls both firms, we obtain:
Proposition 12 Under social planning, the optimal advertising eﬀorts for generic
output levels are:
aSPH =
1 + 4cH(θ1 − xH − sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
; aSPL =
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − xH − xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
while steady state output levels are:
xSPH =
2bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ) + s(cL + cH(−1 + 4cLθ1 − 4cLsθ1))
4cHcL(2bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
xSPL =
−cLs+ cH(1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s))
4cHcL(2bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
.
The social optimum is a saddle point.
13
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 : Comparisons
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One last remark is in order, concerning the diﬀerent incentives to invest in adver-
tising in the three regimes. The state dynamics (11) (the same across regimes) and
the dynamics of advertising eﬀorts ai (changing across regimes) are drawn in figure
2. Without further proof, the properties of this graph, together with the appropriate
expressions of optimal advertising eﬀorts in the three regimes, produce the following
Proposition.
Proposition 13 For a given xj it follows that aSPi > a
D
i > a
M
i implying that x
SP
i >
xDi > x
M
i .
As the planner aims at maximising the sum of profits and consumer surplus, and
qualities are the same across regimes, then clearly the social incentive to invest in
advertising is driven by the fact that increasing the extent of market coverage amounts
to increasing welfare. This also explains that, in both profit-seeking regimes, which
by definition do not take into account consumer surplus, the advertising expenditure
must be lower than the socially desirable investment. Moreover, if each variety is
supplied by an independent firm, she surely invests more to advertise her product
than a monopolist would do for the same variety. The reason is that a single-product
duopolist wants to steal costumers from the demand basin of the rival, which of course
cannot be the case for a multiproduct monopolist.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a diﬀerential duopoly game where each firm may invest both
in product quality and advertising campaigns. We have assumed that sales evolve
over time in response of advertising investments, while product quality improvements
do not require any capital accumulation to take place. Contrary to the results we
are familiar with from static analyses, we have shown that there exists a range of
parameters in which the low-quality firm gains a higher market share as well as higher
profits than the rival. The reason behind this result lies in the relative eﬃciency of
the advertising technologies used by the two firms.
Moreover, we have shown that the level of product quality provided by a duopoly
corresponds to the one which is socially desirable. This is true also under a monop-
olistic regime. The unique distortions which arise at the privately optimal equilibria
are on the output side. These downward distortions due to market power are obvi-
ously induced by pricing above marginal cost and are therefore qualitatively the same
as in the static literature.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider first the system composed by (11) in com-
bination with the appropriate kinematics of the control variable ai, that is, (22) or
(23), alternatively. In the two cases, that can be treated in isolation because of the
separated dynamics assumed in the model, the system can be written in matrix form
as follows:
% ·
xH
·
aH
&
=

−δ 1
2 2bH(δ + ρ)
 
xH
aH

+


0
sxL −
1
4cH
− θ1


% ·
xL
·
aL
&
=

−δ 1
2s 2bL(δ + ρ)
 
xL
aL

+


0
sxH −
1
4cL
− sθ1


Since the determinants of the above 2×2matrices are both negative, the equilibria
we have obtained are two saddles. From the phase diagram, it is clear that these can
be approached only along the north-west arm of the saddle path.
Figure 3 : Phase Diagram
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Numerical duopoly example. Take the following numerical values of parameters:
θ1 = 1; bL =
1
10
; cH =
7
10
; cL =
3
4
; s =
9
10
; δ = ρ =
1
20
. (a1)
If so, then πSSL > π
SS
H for all bH > hbH * 22.105. Setting bH = 22.3, the numerical
values of equilibrium variables are:
πSSH * 0.2037; πSSL * 0.2041; xSSH * 0.4178; xSSL = 0.4760. (a2)
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Proof of Proposition 11. First order conditions relative to the Hamiltonian (35)
are:
∂HM
∂qi
= 0⇒ xi − 2ciqixi = 0⇒ qi =
1
2ci
(a3)
∂HM
∂ai
= 0⇒ −2aibi + λi = 0⇒ λi = 2aibi ⇒
·
λi= 2
·
ai bi (a4)
∂HM
∂xH
= −δλH + θ1 + qH − cHq2H − 2xH − 2sxL = ρλH−
·
λH (a5)
∂HM
∂xL
= −δλL + qL − cLq2L + s(θ1 − 2xH − 2xL) = ρλL−
·
λL (a6)
along with the same initial and transversality conditions as in duopoly.
From (a5) and (a6):
·
λH= (δ + ρ)λH − θ1 − qH + cHq2H + 2xH + 2sxL (a7)
·
λL= (δ + ρ)λL − qL + cLq2L − s(θ1 − 2xH − 2xL) (a8)
while from (a4):
·
aH=
·
λH
2bH
= − 1
4cH
− θ1 + 2aHbH(δ + ρ) + 2xH + 2sxL (a9)
·
aL=
·
λL
2bL
= − 1
4cL
+ 2aLbL(δ + ρ) + s(−θ1 + 2xH + 2xL). (a10)
The steady state equilibrium requires
q ·
aH= 0,
·
aL= 0
r
:
aMH =
1 + 4cH(θ1 − 2xH − 2sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
; aML =
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − 2xH − 2xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
(a11)
Then, simplifying the kinematics of states yields:
·
xH=
1 + 4cH(θ1 − 2xH − 2sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
− δxH (a12)
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·
xL=
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − 2xH − 2xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
− δxL (a13)
At the resulting unique steady state, sales are:
xSSH =
bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ) + s(cL + cH(−1 + 4cLθ1 − 4cLsθ1))
8cHcL(bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
(a14)
xSSL =
−cLs+ cH(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s))
8cHcL(bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
(a15)
The dynamic system can be written in matrix form:


·
xH
·
aH
·
xL
·
aL

 =


−δ 1 0 0
2 2bH(δ + ρ) 2s 0
0 0 −δ 1
2s 0 2s 2bL(δ + ρ)




xH
aH
xL
aL

+


0
− 1
4cH
− θ1
0
− 1
4cL
− sθ1


By computing the four eigenvalues, it is easy to assess that: λ1 = λ3 > 0 and
λ2 = λ4 < 0. Hence the equilibrium is a saddle point.
Proof of Proposition 12. First order conditions relative to the social planner’s
Hamiltonian (36) are:
∂HSP
∂qi
= 0⇒ xi − 2ciqixi = 0⇒ qi =
1
2ci
(a16)
∂HSP
∂ai
= 0⇒−2aibi + λii = 0⇒ λii = 2aibi ⇒
·
λii= 2
·
ai bi (a17)
∂HSP
∂xH
= −δλH + θ1 + qH − cHq2H − xH − sxL = ρλHH−
·
λHH (a18)
∂HSP
∂xL
= −δλLL + qL − cLq2L + s(θ1 − xH − xL) = ρλLL−
·
λLL (a19)
with the same initial and transversality conditions as in the previous cases.
From (a18) and (a19):
·
λH= (δ + ρ)λH − θ1 − qH + cHq2H + xH + sxL (a20)
18
·
λL= (δ + ρ)λL − qL + cLq2L − s(θ1 − xH − xL) (a21)
while from (a17):
·
aH=
·
λH
2bH
= − 1
4cH
− θ1 + 2aHbH(δ + ρ) + xH + sxL (a22)
·
aL=
·
λL
2bL
= − 1
4cL
+ 2aLbL(δ + ρ) + s(−θ1 + xH + xL) (a23)
The steady state equilibrium requirement
q ·
aH= 0,
·
aL= 0
r
yields:
aSPH =
1 + 4cH(θ1 − xH − sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
; aSPL =
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − xH − xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
(a24)
that can be used to rewrite the state equations:
·
xH=
1 + 4cH(θ1 − xH − sxL)
8bHcH(δ + ρ)
− δxH (a25)
·
xL=
1 + 4cLs(θ1 − xH − xL)
8bLcL(δ + ρ)
− δxL (a26)
Solving the system
q ·
xH= 0,
·
xL= 0
r
, one obtains the steady state sales:
xSSH =
2bLcLδ(1 + 4cHθ1)(δ + ρ) + s(cL + cH(−1 + 4cLθ1 − 4cLsθ1))
4cHcL(2bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
(a27)
xSSL =
−cLs+ cH(1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 4cLθ1s))
4cHcL(2bLδ(δ + ρ)(1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ) + (1 + 2bHδ(δ + ρ)− s)s)
(a28)
Finally, the dynamic system can be written in matrix form, as follows:


·
xH
·
aH
·
xL
·
aL

 =


−δ 1 0 0
1 2bH(δ + ρ) s 0
0 0 −δ 1
s 0 s 2bL(δ + ρ)




xH
aH
xL
aL

+


0
− 1
4cH
− θ1
0
− 1
4cL
− sθ1


Again, computing the four eigenvalues one can check that: λ1 = λ3 > 0 and
λ2 = λ4 < 0. Therefore, the equilibrium is a saddle point.
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